The South African Denuclearization Exemplar

ABSTRACT

South Africa's nuclear disarmament is a unique historical case, notable in part for the dramatic shift from deception to cooperation. The unprecedented transparency it demonstrated in order to convince the international community of the veracity of their disarmament is heralded as an exemplar for verifiable denuclearization. Less known is how this case affords insights into how a nuclear weapon program can be clandestinely hidden by the ambiguity provided by an otherwise completely legitimate, peaceful, nuclear energy program. Using a variety of open sources, including newly declassified internal South African and US government reports, it can be shown that South Africa employed a variety of deceptive tactics before it disarmed, and even for nearly two years after becoming a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This article reviews that information to derive instructive lessons on the lengths that a nuclear proliferant state might go to conceal its true capabilities and intentions, and to thwart international discovery of the existence and full extent of an existing—or, in this case, a former—nuclear weapon program.     

Reflections on Transparency and Monitoring under the 1993 United States-Russian Federation Highly Enriched Uranium Purchase Agreement

ABSTRACT

The 1993 Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Purchase Agreement between the United States and Russian Federation is often described as one of the world's most successful nuclear nonproliferation programs. In 2013, the two states achieved the agreement's major goals of downblending 500 metric tons of Russian weapon-origin HEU to low enriched uranium (LEU) and delivering all resultant LEU to the United States. At one time, the LEU delivered under the agreement generated nearly 10 percent of all electricity in the United States. The agreement achieved its nonproliferation goals through a unique government/industry partnership. Commercial executive agents contracted for the annual sale and delivery of downblended LEU, while the US and Russian governments exercised reciprocal transparency monitoring measures to demonstrate that all LEU delivered under the agreement was derived from Russian weapons-origin HEU, and that the same LEU was used for exclusively peaceful purposes in the United States. The commercial development, negotiations, and implementation of the agreement have been well documented. This article describes the scope of US transparency monitoring activities in Russian HEU processing facilities, as well as Russian monitoring in the United States. In addition, it discusses the results of twenty years of reciprocal transparency monitoring and data analysis, and outlines lessons learned that are potentially applicable to future transparency monitoring and verification regimes and similar cooperative efforts.     

Confronting the “Perpetual Menace to Human Security”

Nuclear weapon states historically have attached great secrecy to their nuclear weapon and fissile material production programs and stockpiles, despite warnings that this would fuel fears, handicap informed debate and decision making, and drive arms races. As evidenced by the “Action Plan on Nuclear Disarmament” agreed upon at the 2010 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Review Conference, however, the international community now sees greater transparency about nuclear weapon and fissile material stocks as necessary for enabling and monitoring progress toward nuclear disarmament. To support this effort, the International Panel on Fissile Materials has proposed a step-by-step program for weapon states to declare their inventories, production histories, and disposition of nuclear warheads and fissile materials, and to set up joint projects to develop methods for verifying these declarations. This openness initiative is described here, and could be adopted at the 2015 NPT Review Conference, laying a basis for negotiating verifiable deep reductions in nuclear arsenals and their eventual elimination.     

靶标系统集控软件设计

为提高靶场现有靶标设备的综合利用效率,解决战术射击训练时大量不同型号靶标混合使用中的集中控制问题,采用软件集成方式,设计开发一种模块化、通讯协议自适应的集控系统软件,通过基于XML的协议解析模板,动态匹配不同通讯协议的靶标设备,解决多型设备集成应用问题。实际应用结果表明,该系统有效提升了靶场现有设备的利用效率,同时也为靶场其他应用系统的综合集成提供了很好的实现途径。     

基于整车虚拟道路行驶试验的车辆零部件疲劳分析

针对现有车辆零部件精确疲劳分析依赖成本高昂的实车试验的问题,提出了一种利用整车虚拟样机仿真分析零部件疲劳寿命的方法。该方法通过在ADAMS/CAR中用整车虚拟样机在虚拟道路模型上进行行驶试验,利用多体系统动力学基于模态坐标的求解特点,使用模态应力恢复技术准确还原出了用于零部件疲劳寿命分析的载荷历程。将该方法应用于某车辆双横臂前悬中的下控制臂,在较短的时间内获得了该零件的预测疲劳寿命、寿命安全系数及危险部位等信息。应用结果表明,该方法可作为汽车设计过程与测试过程中的有效试验手段。     

ATM协议识别方法及其受系统误码分布的影响分析

分析了协议识别的概念,提出了用于ATM协议识别的策略及其状态机模型,建立了系统误码的分布模型,通过理论公式推导与仿真,重点对δ、α的取值及其对ATM协议识别概率的影响进行了分析。     

Shor-Preskill方法不能直接证明B92量子密钥分配协议

密钥分配协议安全性的证明是确保密钥分配绝对安全的要求 ,经典密码方案的安全性大多难以证明 ,而利用量子力学的基本原理 ,可以证明量子密码方案是无条件安全的。介绍了Shor Preskill对BB84量子密钥分配协议无条件安全性的证明方法 ,归纳了其技巧和特点 ,揭示了对称化方法和量子纠缠提纯技术在该方法中的作用。证明了Shor Preskill方法不能直接用来证明B92协议的无条件安全性。提出了利用Shor Preskill方法间接证明B92的可能途径。     

坦克数据通讯网中的协议分析

通过对坦克车内局域网1553B协议的分析,并与一般计算机通信标准局域网做对比,指出不能用标准局域网协议和纶构取代1553B协议。参考 ISO开放系统互连的协议模型,对1553B协议进行了分层设计和进一步构想。     

论管理协议细栈MTS的构造

开放系统互连管理 OSIM 是 OSI 参考模型中定义的特定应用服务元素 SASE 之一,也是唯一涉及全部七层协议的服务元素。OSIM 在控制和协调 Multivendor 和 Multidomain系统中所起的作用已使它成为改进网络性能和服务水平的关键性因素。并非所有开放系统均能提供全七层支持,因此,本文提出一种管理协议细栈 MTS(Management Thin Stack)结构,讨论了它自身的构造性特及其在上述管理环境下的作用。     

分布式BGP协议体系结构

随着Internet规模的扩展和连接密度的增加,作为域间路由标准的BGP协议面临严峻挑战。集群路由器的出现,其分布式的计算资源、存储资源以及体系结构上的高度可扩展,有利于解决BGP协议面临的这些问题。在分析BGP协议体系结构无法适应集群路由器分布式特点的基础上,通过对BGP协议功能的解耦合,提出一种新的、分布式的BGP协议体系结构。与传统方式相比,分布式BGP体系结构能够充分利用集群路由器的分布式的计算资源和存储资源,在协议可靠性、管理维护成本、协议多维可扩展性和简化BGP网络设计等方面具有极大优势。